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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

private remedy. Therefore, FIFRA did not provide a private right to
sue.
The Coalition alleged the spraying program also violated the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA"). The Court determined the argument called for a broad
interpretation of the CWA and reasoned that this view was in conflict
with congressional intent. Again, the court pointed out that Congress
intended no private right to sue for these types of violations.
The Coalition argued the unintentional drift of the pesticide
violated the CWA because minuscule particles penetrated the
navigable waters surrounding the City. The court reasoned that EPA
registers pesticides for this type of use because they will not have an
unreasonable effect on the environment. To hold differently would
frustrate the regulatory intent of the CWA. The court further
concluded that a violation of the CWA did not occur simply because
the particles might ultimately end up in the water. To violate the CWA
the insecticide must be discharged into the navigable waters. The City
discharged these pesticides into the air and the CWA's definition of
"discharged" did not include this activity.
Next, the Coalition contended the City sprayed the insecticide
directly over navigable waters in violation of the CWA. The court
concluded the Coalition failed to present evidence that the City
sprayed the pesticide directly over navigable waters, and therefore,
refused to grant an injunction. However, the court denied the City's
motion to dismiss in order to allow the Coalition further discovery.
The Coalition also asserted the spraying program violated RCRA in
that once the City sprayed the pesticide, it became discarded waste.
RCRA states that a substance is not discarded waste until it has served
its purpose. The court concluded spraying the pesticide into the air
did not fit the definition of discarded waste under RCRA.
Finally, the Coalition asked the court to enjoin the spraying
program because the City failed to prepare an environmental impact
statement as required by the State Environmental Quality Review. The
court pointed to an emergency exception to this requirement. The
court held the threat of a mosquito-borne infectious disease
constituted an emergency under this provision.
Lynne Stadjuhar
Technical Rubber Co. v. Buckeye Egg Farm, L.P., No. 2:99-CV-1413,
2000 U.S. Dist. IEXIS 8602 (S.D. Ohio June 16, 2000) (holding
federal law did not preempt a landowner's state claims based upon a
neighboring landowner's actions in the same state in which the cause
of action arose).
Technical Rubber Company and other property owners
(collectively, "Plaintiffs") originally filed this suit in the Court of
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Common Pleas for Licking County, Ohio, on claims of nuisance,
trespass, and negligence. Plaintiffs' properties neighbored an egg
farm owned and operated by Buckeye Egg Farm, L.P. ("Buckeye").
Plaintiffs alleged that Buckeye failed to properly manage the farm
causing air, water, and soil contamination in and around Plaintiffs'
properties. Buckeye removed the action to federal court on the basis
of federal question jurisdiction pursuant to the Clean Water Act
("CWA") and the Clean Air Act ("CAA"). Buckeye contended these
federal statutes completely preempted any state law claims. Plaintiffs
responded that the federal statutes did not completely preempt their
state law claims and moved to remand.
The court noted that a party seeking removal bears the burden to
establish the right to remove and any doubts must be resolved in favor
of remand. Additionally, removal to district court is proper if at least
one claim falls within the court's original jurisdiction. Thus, if
Plaintiffs' complaint presented a federal question then removal was
proper. However, Plaintiffs control their claim and can avoid federal
jurisdiction by relying entirely on state law. The court further
explained that the mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of
action does not automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction
because not every question of federal law emerging in a suit is proof
that a federal law is the basis of the suit.
Buckeye claimed Plaintiffs' complaint specifically included federal
statutes, and the nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims were based
on federal law since they included air, soil, and water pollution. The
court recognized that although the complaint specifically stated
Buckeye had violated state and/or federal law, those claims did not
further discuss federal law. Additionally, Plaintiffs had represented (1)
they did not intend to assert federal causes of action; (2) they did not
ask for monetary and injunctive relief when the federal statutes only
provide for injunctive relief; and (3) they did not attempt to comply
with the notification requirements of the CWA's and CAA's citizen suit
provisions. Accordingly, the court found Plaintiffs' claims did not rely
solely on federal law.
Buckeye also argued that, regardless of Plaintiffs' intent, the CWA
and the CAA completely preempted their state law claims. The court
stated that if a federal remedy was the only remedy available then
removal to federal court was proper. In addition, if federal law
completely preempted an entire area of state law, then courts must
consider any claim a federal claim. However, courts should presume
that Congress's intent was not to supplant state law. To support its
argument Buckeye cited two cases where the CWA preempted state
law. However, the court distinguished those cases from the instant
case and found that since this litigation involved only parties from
Ohio, and damages arising only in Ohio, the federal CWA did not
preempt Plaintiffs' state law claims. The court also found the CAA did
not preempt Plaintiffs' state law claims, and accordingly, remanded

Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

the case back to state court.
Rebekah King
Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 92 F. Supp.
2d 1072 (D. Or. 2000) (holding (1) plaintiffs' prior action under a
federal statute did not bar a subsequent federal complaint under a
different statute; (2) judicial review under the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") was proper; (3) Army Corps of Engineers'
"Records of Decisions" represented final agency actions for the
purpose of APA review; and (4) plaintiffs' alleged injury was sufficient
to defeat defendant's lack of standing claim).
Defendant, Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), owned and
operated four dams located on the lower Snake River that comprised
part of the Federal Columbia River Power System. The National
Wildlife Federation and a number of other concerned groups
(collectively, "NWF") initiated an action against the Corps alleging
violations of both the Clean Water Act ("CWA") and the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").
The Corps and the National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS")
drafted numerous reports in an effort to mitigate the adverse effects of
the dams on the salmon stocks in the Lower Snake and Columbia
Rivers. A Biological Opinion ("BiOp"), issued by NMFS, noted that
the dams' creation of reduced flow rates through the reservoirs
contributed to the decline of all three Snake River salmon species. As
a result, in 1995 the Corps issued a Record of Decision ("ROD"),
which adopted the "Reasonable and Prudent Alternative" measures
advanced in the BiOp. One such measure included the adjustment of
spill water over the dams in order to increase fish passage and improve
water quality. In 1998, the Corps issued a ROD indicating its intention
to take advisement from a NMFS Technical Management Team
("TMT"), as recommended by the BiOp. A month later, the TMT
prepared a Water Management Plan ("Plan") for the Federal
Columbia River Power System. The Plan referenced the CWA and
Washington's water quality standards promulgated under that Act. It
recommended that "every effort be made to meet the state.., water
quality standards in the mainstem."
Washington's regulations indicated what levels should be
considered as unacceptable for water temperature and dissolved gas
percentages. Adhering to its own policy to "comply with water quality
standards to the extent practicable," the Corps instituted a monitoring
program in which data was compiled. Such data illustrated that
variations in optimum temperature levels increased salmon
susceptibility to both predation and disease.
populations'
Furthermore, high dissolved gas levels in the water were shown to have
negative physiological effects on the fish. Although this data was

